論文 Comparing behavior between a large sample of smart students and Japanese adults JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 2022(Nov.) Author:Nobuyuki Hanaki; Keigo Inukai; Takehito Masuda; Yuta Shimodaira Abstract:We address a concern about the external validity of an experiment conducted with university students related to the representativeness of the sampled population in particular. We do so by conducting large-scale (partly) incentivized online surveys of students at a Japanese university and of a sample of Japanese adults to measure individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, mentalizing skills, preferences for risk and distribution, and personality traits. While significant differences between these two samples are observed in many of these characteristics, the correlational structures among these characteristics are very similar in the two samples.
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS,25(3):902-941 2022(Jun.) Author:Takehito Masuda; Ryo Mikami; Toyotaka Sakai; Shigehiro Serizawa; Takuma Wakayama Abstract:Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper
A mechanism for the diffusion of electric vehicles: A theoretical and experimental study SSRN Working Paper 2021(Jun. 02) Author:Tatsuhiro Shichijo,Takao Kusakawa,Takehito Masuda,Emiko Fukuda,Tatsuyoshi Saijo Abstract:SSRN Working Paper
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication Osaka U ISER Discussion Paper 2021(Mar. 22) Author:M. Aoyagi, T. Masuda and N. Nishimura Abstract:Osaka U ISER Discussion Paper
Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing ISER Discussion Paper Series,1064 2019(Oct.) Author:Y. Kamijo; T Masuda; H. Uemura
Higher order risk attitudes and prevention under different timings of loss Experimental Economics,22(1):197-215 2019(Mar.) Author:Takehito Masuda; Eungik Lee
Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: Com-parison with Varian’s compensation mechanism Social Choice and Welfare,51(1):65-77 2018(Jun. 01) Author:Tatsuyoshi Saijo; Takehito Masuda; Takafumi Yamakawa Abstract:After having played a prisoner’s dilemma, players can approve or reject the other’s choice of cooperation or defection. If both players approve the other’s choice, the outcome is the result of the chosen strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma
however, if either rejects the other’s choice, the outcome is the same as if they had mutually defected from the prisoner’s dilemma. In theory, such an approval mechanism implements cooperation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies, although this is not the case in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By contrast, the compensation mechanism proposed by Varian (Am Econ Rev 84(5):1278–1293, 1994) implements cooperation in the latter but not in the former. This result motivates the present experimental study of the two mechanisms. The approval mechanism sessions yield a cooperation rate of 90% in the first period and 93.2% across periods, while the compensation mechanism sessions yield a cooperation rate of 63.3% in the first period and 75.2% across periods. In addition, the backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies better predicts subjects’ behavior than does the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both mechanism sessions.
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions University of Arizona Department of Economics Working Papers，2017-16 2017(Oct.) Author:Xiaochuang Huang; Takehito Masuda; Yoshitaka Okano; Tatsuyoshi Saijo
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,83:73-85 2014(Jan.) Author:Takehito Masuda; Yoshitaka Okano; Tatsuyoshi Saijo Abstract:We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in multiple solution concepts including backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects' responses to the questionnaire reveal heterogeneous reasoning processes and highlight the importance of developing mechanisms that implement the desired social choice outcome in multiple solution concepts. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication CREST/LESSAC Workshop in Experimental Economics 2022(Sep. 28) Presenter:M. Aoyagi, T. Masuda and N. Nishimura Abstract:Osaka U ISER Discussion Paper
The Titanic effect: an experimental study of turnout in groupwise weighted voting Economic Science Association Asia Pacific Meeting 2022(Mar. 17) Presenter:Takehito Masuda
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication 東アジア実験・行動経済学ｵﾝﾗｲﾝセミナー 2021(Sep. 15) Presenter:M. Aoyagi T Masuda and N. Nishimura
Strategic Ambiguity and Probabilistic Sophistication 経法学部スタッフセミナー 2020(Dec. 23) Presenter:M. Aoyagi T Masuda and N. Nishimura Abstract:経法学部スタッフセミナー
Strategic Ambiguity and Probabilistic Sophistication 経済理論ワークショップでのセミナー発表 2020(Oct. 29) Presenter:M. Aoyagi T Masuda and N. Nishimura Abstract:経済理論ワークショップでのセミナー発表
Strategic Ambiguity and Probabilistic Sophistication k-connex研究会 2020(Jan. 24) Presenter:舛田 武仁
A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction International Workshop on Experimental Economics 2019(Dec. 04) Presenter:Takehito Masuda, Toyataka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, Takuma Wakayama
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions NYUAD-APET "At the Forefront of Public Economics" Conference 2017(Dec. 16) Presenter:Xiaochuan Huang; Takehito Masuda; Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Higher order risk attitudes and prevention under different timings of loss : A laboratory experiment Seoul National University Research in Economics Workshop 2017(Nov. 10) Presenter:Takehito Masuda; Eungik Lee
Higher order risk attitudes and prevention under different timings of loss : A laboratory experiment Cross-discipline experimental readings,University of Arizona 2017(Oct. 02) Presenter:Takehito Masuda; Eungik Lee
Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes Economic Science Association World Meeting 2017(Jun. 23) Presenter:Yoshio Kamijo; Takehito Masuda; Hiroshi Uemura
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions Asian Meeting of Econometric Society 2016(Aug. 11) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions World Congress of Game Theory Society 2016(Jul. 27) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions Asian Economic Institute Workshop 2016(Apr.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions 京都大学経済研究 所ミクロ経済学・ ゲーム理論研究会報告 2016(Apr.) Presenter:X.Huang, T.Masuda, Y.Oksano, T.Saijo
Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions Joint Meeting of JSMB and CJK Colloquium on Mathematical Biology JSMB symposium "Social Dilemma" 2015(Aug. 29) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes 日本経済学会 2015(May) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes ソシオネットワーク研究機構経済実験センターワークショップ 2015(Mar.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The Simplified Approval Mechanism for a Solution to the Social Dilemma ゲーム理論セミナー 2014(Feb.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
Informational Impact of Egalitarian Government on Collusion in Sequential Procurement Auction 日本経済学会 2013(Sep.) Presenter:T.Kawamura, T.Masuda, T.Saijo
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally Summer School of Econometric Society 2013(Aug.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 同志社実験会計学研究会 2013(Jul.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally Asia-Pacific Economic Science Association Conference 2013(Feb.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 同志社実験会計学研 究会 2013(Feb.) Presenter:T.Masuda, Y.Okano, T.Saijo
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 実験社会科学カンファレンス 2012(Dec.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 特定領域研究「実験社会科学」市場班・理論班ワークショップ 2012(Oct.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 大阪府立大学理論・計量経済学セミナー 2011(Dec.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 日本経済学会 2011(Oct.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2011(Jul.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Science Association Conference 2011(Feb.) Presenter:舛田 武仁
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally Shanghai Jiao Tong University-Osaka University Exchange Workshop 2010 Presenter:舛田 武仁
学術論文査読件数 2022- , Economic Theory 2021- , Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2019- , Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 2019- , International Journal of Economic Theory 2019- , Journal of the Economic Science Association 2015- , Games and Economic Behavior 2013- , International Economic Review 2012- , Social Choice and Welfare
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